NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN GHANA

2019
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN GHANA

2019
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Directive by the President of the Republic iii
Abbreviations/Acronyms v
Executive Summary vii

**Introduction**

Section One: General Overview

- Introduction 3
- Strategic Environment 4
- Global and Regional Context 5
- Domestic Context 5
- Guiding Principles 6
- Strategic Aims and Objectives 7
- National Response 8
- Clarification of Concepts 9

Section Two: Pillar One - Prevent

- Introduction 11
- Preventing Radicalisation of Vulnerable and Disadvantaged Groups 12
- Education and Awareness Creation 13

Section Three: Pillar Two - Pre-empt

- Introduction 16
- National Early Warning Systems and Terror Risk Assessment 17
- Terrorist Financing 19
Section Four: Pillar Three - Protect

Introduction 21
Reducing the Vulnerabilities of Critical National Infrastructure 22
Securing Crowded Places 23
Safeguarding the National Borders of Ghana 23
Reducing the Vulnerability of the Transport System 24
Enhancing Cyber Security 25
Review of Anti/Counter Terrorism Related Legislations and Policies 25

Section Five: Pillar Four - Respond

Introduction 27
National Security Council 28
Ministry of National Security 29
Institutional Responses 30
Institutional Capacity Development 30
Information Management and Dissemination 31
Prosecution 32
Building Resilience 33

Section Six: Implementation Plan

Introduction 34
National Security Council 35
Implementing the NAFPCVET 35

Section Seven: Conclusion

Conclusion 42

Annexes

Annex A. Roles and Responsibilities of Ministries 44
Annex B. Roles and Responsibilities of Departments and Agencies 50
DIRECTIVE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Violent, extremist activities and terrorist attacks across some African countries, especially in some of our immediate neighbours in the Sahel, serve as a continued reminder of the threat that terrorism poses, both to our people and to our way of life. I made a solemn promise to the Ghanaian people that Government will take the necessary measures to preserve their safety and security. The National Framework for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism and Terrorism is aimed at keeping this promise.

We recognise that we must prevent and combat violent extremist groups and terrorists who threaten the security of our country, and protect our national interests from such attacks. This requires a well-defined, inter-agency approach for preventing and combating the menace. Indeed, several security measures have been put in place to combat the activities of extremist groups and potential terrorist threats.

However, we recognise also that a government/society-oriented approach is required to address the drivers of extremism amongst our population. That is why Government found it important and prudent to develop a National Framework for the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism and Terrorism. The framework has a greater focus on ensuring systematic co-ordination across Ministries, Departments and Agencies and Civil Society Organisations. Ghana is a signatory to various international instruments geared against Violent Extremism and Terrorism. We want to ensure that every citizen is in the fight against this potential threat.

In line with the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, I directed that a strategic approach to our efforts be developed. This effort has resulted in this National Framework which will be implemented by all relevant Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies. A National Counter Terrorism Centre will be established, under the Ministry of National Security, to co-ordinate all efforts towards
achieving the objectives of the National Framework. Additionally, the Framework will be linked to the various Regional Security Councils (REGSECs), Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Security Councils (METROSECs/MUSECs/DISECs), and other stakeholders, to make it difficult for potential terrorists and their sympathisers who plan to execute their activity in the country to succeed.

This Framework will not overlook the critical economic, political and social measures we need to engineer to assist in the fight against terrorism. Addressing issues of inequality, marginalisation of groups, access to education and healthcare, stimulating economic development in deprived communities, promoting inter-communal dialogue, enhancing religious tolerance, de-emphasising ethnic divisions and chieftaincy conflicts – these are necessary adjuncts to the arsenal of security and intelligence resources needed to win the fight.

We shall deny terrorists the opportunity to cross our borders, and also prevent the emergence of terrorist groups in Ghana. We refuse to be attacked in our own country by terrorists and violent extremists. By working together, state and non-state actors will be properly prepared to prevent and counter any form of terrorism on our shores.

NANA ADDO DANKWA AKUFO-ADDO
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AML/CFT</td>
<td>Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Mission in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNC</td>
<td>Bureau of National Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNI</td>
<td>Bureau of National Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOG</td>
<td>Bank of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNI</td>
<td>Critical National Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Defence Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISEC</td>
<td>District Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVLA</td>
<td>Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECG</td>
<td>Electricity Company of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDRT</td>
<td>Emergency Disaster Response Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOCO</td>
<td>Economic and Organised Crime Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATF</td>
<td>Financial Action Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDA</td>
<td>Food and Drugs Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIC</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAF</td>
<td>Ghana Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCAA</td>
<td>Ghana Civil Aviation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMA</td>
<td>Ghana Maritime Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRA-CD</td>
<td>Ghana Revenue Authority - Customs Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Ghana Immigration Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Ghana Police Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPHA</td>
<td>Ghana Ports and Habours Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRDA</td>
<td>Ghana Railway Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRIDCO</td>
<td>Ghana Grid Company Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISWAP</td>
<td>Islamic State in West African Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAs</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments and Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METSEC</td>
<td>Metropolitan Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNS</td>
<td>Ministry of National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSEC</td>
<td>Municipal Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADMO</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Communications Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCE</td>
<td>National Commission for Civic Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCS</td>
<td>National Cyber Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCSC</td>
<td>National Cyber Security Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPC</td>
<td>National Development Planning Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFPCVET</td>
<td>National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NECC</td>
<td>National Emergency Communication Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEWS</td>
<td>National Early Warning Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NITA</td>
<td>National Information Technology Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIA</td>
<td>National Identification Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMC</td>
<td>National Media Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>National Petroleum Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Peace Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRSC</td>
<td>National Road Safety Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCVE</td>
<td>Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD</td>
<td>Research Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGSEC</td>
<td>Regional Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VE</td>
<td>Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRA</td>
<td>Volta River Authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GENERAL

1. Ghana has a long history of democratic governance, social cohesion and peaceful co-existence. The country is however not oblivious of the global threat of Violent-Extremism and Terrorism and has been following the evolution of the threat globally as well as on the African continent, especially the Sahel-Sahara and the West African sub-regions. Ghana is signatory to various international instruments against Violent-Extremism and Terrorism and has developed a legal framework to prevent and combat Violent-Extremism and Terrorism in the country.

2. In cognizance of the evolution of the threat in the West African sub-region, and its likely impact on Ghana, and for purposes of coordination, it has become necessary to clearly outline the principles, measures and architecture that will drive the response effort to Violent-Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana. The National Framework for Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism (NAFPCVET) seeks to set out the context, the stakeholders and the architecture for the assignment of responsibilities and coordination of effort from national down to the community level in Ghana.

3. As a derivative of the overarching National Security Strategy, the Framework forms the basis for the production of detailed and comprehensive National, Institutional, Regional, District and Community Action Plans for the prevention and countering of violent extremism and terrorism in Ghana.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES

4. The Ghana National Framework for Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism is based on the following principles:

   a. **Education and Awareness Creation:** This aims at dedicated effort to educate the general public and create societal awareness on the
negative effects of Violent-Extremism and Terrorism and why we should deny recruitment and support to Violent Extremist and Terrorist ideology.

b. **Prevention:** The framework prioritizes prevention as the optimal and preferred option to address the threats of Violent-Extremism and Terrorism. It entails the identification of our vulnerabilities to the threats and building adequate resilience to pre-empt their incidence.

c. **Human Rights and the Rule of Law:** All efforts to prevent or counter Violent-Extremism and Terrorism are to be anchored in the respect for Human Rights, the Rule of Law and Human Dignity.

d. **Good Governance and Social Cohesion:** Governance that upholds and promotes inclusion, equal opportunity and social cohesion is a sine qua non for the successful implementation of this framework.

e. **All-Inclusive Approach:** The successful implementation of this framework relies on a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach that involves all stakeholders including members of our local communities.

f. **Cooperation and Collaboration:** Ghana’s all-inclusive approach to the prevention and countering of Violent-Extremism and Terrorism entails cooperation and collaboration by all stakeholders in order to deliver a coordinated, timely and appropriate response to the threat. Stakeholders also include the private sector, the academia as well as Ghana’s foreign partners.

**REVIEW OF THE SITUATION**

5. **Strategic Context.** The threat of Violent-Extremism and Terrorism to Ghana has both international and domestic dimensions.
a. **International Dimension.** The international dimension derives from a world view of violent extremist and terrorist ideology, usually with political, social or religious undertones. It is characterized by the recognition that Violent-Extremism and Terrorism have no respect for international borders. The presence of violent extremist and terrorist groups affiliated to al Qaeda and Islamic State (Daesh) in the West African sub-region brings this threat closer to Ghana. Although Ghana might not be a specified target of these groups, the presence of foreign interests and installations in Ghana, which are usual targets of these groups, makes Ghana a likely target for their attacks. Ghana’s participation in international peace missions such as MINUSMA, AMISOM and MONUSCO could also be a reason for a retaliatory attack on the territory of Ghana.

b. **Domestic Dimension.** In spite of Ghana’s democratic and good governance credentials, factors such as unemployment and youth bulge among others, could become the sources of grievances in some sections of the population which could be exploited by Violent Extremist and Terrorist groups to recruit persons domestically to their cause. Religious belief is also an avenue through which members of local communities could be radicalized to pursue extremist religious ideologies that justify and uphold violent-extremism and terrorism. The NAFPCVET takes cognizance of these two dimensions of the threat to Ghana.

6. **Strategic End State.** The ultimate goal of this Framework is to outline the context within which to mobilize and coordinate the efforts of all sectors of the Ghanaian society to prevent and counter Violent-Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana.

**NATIONAL RESPONSE**

7. The National Framework for Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism is based on four mutually reinforcing pillars:

a. **Prevent:** Deliberate measures to create awareness in order to inhibit Violent-Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana by addressing their root causes, while minimizing our vulnerability to the threat through the building of resilience.
b. **Pre-empt:** Measures for the early detection of violent extremist or terrorist activity and the application of proactive action to deter and pre-empt their incidence.

c. **Protect:** Measures to protect Ghana’s interests and render safe from harm of violent extremist or terrorist attack, vulnerable communities, members of the population, their property, critical infrastructures, mobility corridors and public places as well as virtual/cyberspace.

d. **Respond:** Measures to mitigate the impact of a violent-extremist or terrorist attack and recover from such incident.

**PILLAR ONE: PREVENT**

5. The aim of this pillar is to stop Violent Extremism and Terrorism from gaining roots in any part of the Ghanaian society. It seeks to address both the issue of governance gaps and to discredit and make the narratives and ideology of violent-extremism unattractive to all sections of the Ghanaian society and thereby safeguard vulnerable groups from it. To achieve this entails a myriad of innovative initiatives and programs that address the enabling factors and root causes of mistrust between the Government and the citizenry. It is this mistrust that could lead to a continuum of disappointment, frustration, anger, hopelessness and eventually a rejection of our generally accepted societal beliefs, norms, way of life and legal framework by sections of the society. Various groups may seek alternative means by the use or support of violence to achieve their goals in the first place. This entails a Human Security response approach.

**PILLAR TWO: PRE-EMPT**

6. This pillar deals with uncovering of the activities of violent-extremist or terrorist groups or individuals, identifying the perpetrators usually during the planning and preparation stage and forestalling the activity before it is carried out. Fundamental to the success of this pillar is intelligence capability, both human and technical, that relies on public awareness and the deployment of a mechanism of a pervasive capability for vigilance and monitoring for the provision of accurate and
timely intelligence to first responders. The rigorous and continuous assessment of threat and analysis of available information is key to disrupting terrorist plans before they can be put into effect. The dissemination of early warning of a potential threat and assistance to entities that may be affected and to the public at large, to take the necessary precautions, is essential. Success requires close cooperation and sharing of information among all stakeholder agencies and communities.

**PILLAR THREE: PROTECT**

7. This pillar of the Framework entails the systematic identification of the vulnerabilities of society to the threats of Violent-Extremism and Terrorism and the building of the required resilience to withstand them. It involves measures to safeguard vulnerable communities, critical national infrastructure, mobility corridors and public places as well as cyberspace. Partnership between Government and the private sector, regional and other international partners is of essence to the successful implementation of this pillar.

**PILLAR FOUR: RESPOND**

8. The aim of this pillar is to generate and deliver adequate national response to a terrorist attack ensuring that it is complemented by the other pillars with the synergy of resilience that has already been created to ensure minimum damage, injury or loss of life and a rapid return to normal life. Appropriate threat specific joint training of responder agencies, and inventories of required stores and equipment are fundamental to successful response. In addition to joint training, interoperability of responder agencies is to be enhanced by the joint planning and preparation of the delivery of response to a terrorist incident. The proper coordination of the total national effort of the Security, Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Emergency Services delineating specific complementing roles to each is important to the effective delivery of response without fuss. This could be greatly enhanced by the establishment and proper manning of functional Joint Situation Rooms at all levels.
PRIORITY LINES OF ACTION

9. Considering that the four pillars of the National Framework for Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism are mutually supporting, the effort to implement the framework should ensure that activities emanating from each pillar are pursued along priority lines of action that culminate in a collaborative and coordinated manner into building resilience against Violent-Extremism and Terrorism and preserving Ghana’s Constitutional Democratic way of life. The following Priority Lines of Action form a guide:

   a. Awareness creation and all stakeholder engagement;
   b. Promoting Patriotism, Inclusion, Civic Responsibility and Social Cohesion;
   c. Ensuring Justice, Rule of Law, Human Rights and equal opportunity for all;
   d. Research on the spread of Violent-Extremism Ideology;
   e. Countering Violent Extremist ideologies with a Human Security Response Approach;
   f. Decentralization and Local Economic Development;
   g. Risk Assessments;
   h. Early warning and disruption;
   i. Decisive Action to combat acts of Terrorism;
   j. Cyber security; and
   k. International Cooperation.

COORDINATION COMMAND AND CONTROL

10. The Ministry of National Security (MNS) is responsible to the National Security Council (NSC) for the successful implementation and delivery of the NAFPCVET and shall coordinate the overall implementation of activities under the Framework. In consultation with the NSC, the Minister for National Security shall provide overall direction and co-ordinate the Counter Terrorism and Counter Violent Extremism activities of all stakeholders across Government machinery. This shall be done through the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC). Stake holder institutions across Government including MMDAs, REGSECs, METROSECs, MUSECs, DISECs, the Security, Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Emergency services shall
exercise command and control over their individual Action Plans. Coordination of the Action Plans and the effort of individual stakeholders shall however be exercised in accordance with the architecture established by this Framework.

11. **Framework Coordination Architecture.** The architecture for the successful implementation of the National Framework for Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism shall be as follows:

a. There shall be established at the MNS a National Counter Terrorism Centre.

b. The NCTC shall be responsible to the Minister of National Security for the day to day operational coordination of the National PCVE/CT effort and the implementation of this Framework.

c. The NCTC shall be staffed by personnel drawn from stakeholder institutions across Government, Security, Law Enforcement, Intelligence and such other agencies as the Minister may from time to time decide upon in consultation with the NSC.

d. The MNS shall be the focal point institution for cooperation with partners, regional and international organizations in all matters related to terrorism and violent extremism.

e. A Counter Terrorism Policy Advisory Committee to be chaired by the Minister for National Security shall be established as the policy advisory body of the NCTC. The membership of the Committee shall be from stakeholder institutions.

f. The NCTC shall provide a secretariat and other administrative services for the Policy Advisory Committee.

g. Sub committees of the Advisory Committee may from time to time be established by the Minister of National Security to address particular needs.

h. REGSECs, METROSECs, MUSECs and DISECs shall each have a CT Committee (CTC) to be responsible for advising on Counter Terrorism and Counter Violent Extremism matters.

i. For the purposes of the implementation of this framework, Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism shall be a specifically budgeted activity of the MNS.
1. The scourge of Violent Extremism and Terrorism is both global and domestic. The global threat is informed by a political, socio-economic, religious, or such other world view and the domestic threat tends to be informed by local grievances against the existing system, living conditions and way of life. Both the global and domestic causes and reasons for Violent Extremism and Terrorism feed on, complement and reinforce each other. Over the years Violent Extremism and Terrorism have evolved into serious threats to international peace and security, with debilitating consequences for human security and safety, national stability and development, and seek to undermine the very sovereignty of states. The scourge has thus become a transnational menace that requires both international and national counter-measures.

2. In the absence of a universally accepted definition for violent extremism and terrorism, the binding UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, requires that all UN Member States establish terrorist acts as serious criminal offences in their domestic laws and regulations. UN Member States are also required to provide punishment for terrorist acts that duly reflect the seriousness of the crime. This gives a latitude to individual UN Member States to define “Terrorist Act” in their legislation as they deem fit in their domestic circumstances. This should, however, be in accordance with international legal instruments on terrorism to which the individual Member is a signatory and must also be consistent with the international human rights law. The Resolution requires Member States to take a number of actions to prevent and counter terrorism. Currently, the 2015 UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to prevent Violent Extremism is the guidance provided by the UN to its Member States to legislate and plan their response to Violent Extremism. Domestic legislation therefore determines what constitutes an act of Terrorism or Violent Extremism in any particular national jurisdiction and the response that could be generated against them. The UN from time to time also declares some groups that are reported to carry out or support acts of terrorism. The violent acts of these groups are thus considered as acts of terrorism in the territory in which they occur.
3. The Ghana Anti-Terrorism Act, 2008, Act 762, is the principal legislation that underlines the legal framework on Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana. The Act provides a definition of a terrorist act, criminalizes it and provides punishments associated with the offence. Whilst the National Security Policy of Ghana, provides for the defence of the sovereignty of Ghana and the protection of its citizens and interests, there is still the requirement for a specific framework for the prevention and countering of Violent Extremism and Terrorism in the country. The purpose of this Framework is, therefore, to identify the threat of Violent Extremism and Terrorism that Ghana faces, and provide an architecture, context and strategy to prevent and counter the threat. The Framework seeks to adopt a Human Security response approach to Violent-Extremism and a decisive all-of-society response approach to acts of terrorism.
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Violent Extremism and Terrorism is a serious threat to international peace and security and a menacing challenge that requires both national and international counter-measures. Its lacerating physical, psychological and political impact has established terrorism as a grave threat to human security, stability, development and the sovereignty of States. The threat posed by terrorist networks, organizations and individuals has assumed dramatic shifts in its methodology and modus operandi. Hitherto, a phenomenon that was considered to be isolated vicious crimes has now assumed new and alarming proportions, with devastating consequences.
1.2 A key manifestation of contemporary violent extremism and terrorism in West Africa has been its transnational nature, whereby an attack executed in one location may be premeditated in another, with human and material resources from multiple other locations. There have been major attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, with these attacks occurring about two months after the other. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), commonly known as Boko Haram, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia and other have south to extend their operational theatres and spheres of influence in the region, focusing recent attacks on “soft targets” to cause extensive civilian casualties, perpetrate fear and draw high levels of attention. AQIM for instance has threatened to attack any state involved in the United Nations intervention in Mali.

1.3 Ghana is not an exception to the increasing threat of violent extremism and terrorism. While Ghana has not directly experienced a terrorist attack on home soil, regional and global trends and recent incidents in neighbouring states give serious cause for concern. These threats and trends have necessitated the need for a holistic approach to preventing acts of violent extremism and terrorism in Ghana and to respond promptly to such acts should they occur.

**STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

1.4 The threat of violent extremism and terrorism in Ghana can be viewed within a broader global, regional and domestic context and undercurrents. The constantly evolving war on terror has serious implications on the dynamics of terrorism. Globalization and advancements in technology have enabled the planning, mobilization or execution of the most sophisticated of terrorist attacks against any target from the most obscure of locations. These global trends, exacerbated by political, ideological and religious factors, present veritable challenges to the country. The following sections highlight the factors and dynamics that, in various permutations, make Ghana a potential target for violent extremism and terrorist acts.
Global and Regional Context

1.5 Firstly, the increasing volatility of civil conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, and the fallouts from these wars, have led to state failure and, consequently, insecurity across the African region. The wars and violence in Somalia, Syria, Libya, Mali and Nigeria have produced unintended consequences that continue to destabilize an already fragile neighbourhood. This has further enabled the proliferation of extremist groups and arms, which, underpinned by transnational criminality, presents a serious challenge to states in the region, including Ghana. Secondly, Ghana’s contribution to the United Nations and regional peace operations also represents a source of threat to the country. Violent Extremist and Terrorist Groups includin Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine and Boko Haram have consistently decried peace operations as an affront. Hence, being a major troop and police contributing country, Ghana remains an attractive target for violent extremist and terrorist attacks.

Domestic Context

1.6 The threat of terrorism in Ghana stems from varying and often interrelated sources. Political and religious radicalism, which may manifest in various forms of violence and extremism represents a source of terrorism. Ghana is also confronted with structural challenges and institutional bottlenecks, which have resulted in some lapses in enforcing anti-terrorism strategies, exposing the country to potential acts of terrorism. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the ‘underwear bomber’, arrived in Ghana undetected on 9th December 2009 is a typical example. Twenty-five (25) year old Nazir Alema Nortey, a university graduate who left home to join ISIS, prompting fears of the increasing vulnerability of frustrated Ghanaian youth to Islamist extremist groups, who promise luxurious life to attract recruits to their ranks, is another example. There are reports that many others have reportedly followed Nazir’s steps. These illustrations could serve as avenues for radicalization and successive planning and execution of terrorist attacks on home soil.

1.7 Another dimension of the threat of violent extremism and terrorism in Ghana is the escalating menace of vigilantism, which has found expression in increasing lawlessness and extreme violence in the country. Mostly, linked to the main political
parties in the country, there is an alarming proliferation of such groups who have been emboldened to openly challenge the authority of the state. The example of Boko Haram suggests that, if unchecked, these vigilante groups could breed the country’s active network for homegrown extremist groups.

1.8 The presence of foreign missions and interests further heightens the possibility for a terrorist act in the country. Terrorist attacks against the United States Embassy and Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the UN office in Abuja and Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako, Grand Bassam Beach Resort, the Cappuccino Restaurant and Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou in the past are clear indications that foreign interests and infrastructure could draw Ghana into devastating acts of terror.

1.9 Ghana has acceded to several international conventions and protocols as well as enacted legislative instruments to address the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. At the operational level, the NSC Secretariat has also established a National Task Force on counter violent extremism and terrorism that employs an inter-agency approach to dealing with terrorism. This has led to the establishment of anti-terrorism units in the security agencies.

1.10 However, a myriad of issues remain unaddressed. The lack of a comprehensive national strategy to counter terrorism limits the ability of our security agencies, policymakers and other stakeholders to employ the gamut of tools and resources to prevent and respond to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. This NAFPCVET represent a holistic approach to preventing violent extremism and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, respond to situations of imminent threat and rebuild communities affected by terrorist acts.

**GUIDING PRINCIPLES**

1.11 The NAFPCVET are premised on the following set of core principles:

a. **Prevention:** This strategy prioritizes prevention as the surest way of identifying our vulnerabilities, pre-empting threats and building resilience to terrorism.
b. **Human Rights and the Rule of Law:** Efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism can only be effective if they are anchored on the principles of rule of law and respect for human rights and dignity. Government takes cognizance of the dynamic environment within which counter-terrorism activities are conducted and will, therefore, work within international and national laws to ensure that actions do not affect the rights of citizens or intrude on their civil liberties. We are committed to treating all people fairly, with respect and without prejudice to specific political, ethnic or religious groups.

c. **Good Governance and Social Cohesion:** We are also of the conviction that a successful Framework for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism requires the promotion of good governance, social cohesion and active citizen participation.

d. **All-Inclusive Approach:** While cognizant of the necessity to exercise state powers prudently, we shall leverage both military and non-military strategies to counter-terrorism. We shall rely on our early warning systems to collect information, analyze, detect and deter any acts, which threaten the values and safety of our people. In situations of an imminent threat, our intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies shall lead efforts to protect lives and property and restore normalcy.

e. **Cooperation and Collaboration:** Even though the State is primarily responsible for the protection of the population, security and law enforcement agencies alone cannot ensure effective protection of the populace. Implementation of this strategy will depend on the active support of all Arms of Government, state agencies, non-state actors, civil society organisations, the general public and the international community.

**STRATEGIC AIMS AND OBJECTIVES**

1.12. The aim of this Framework is to prevent terrorism and minimize the threat to Ghana and Ghana’s interests so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. The NAFPCVET shall be guided by the following objectives:
a. Ensure timely analysis and intelligence-led approach to preventing violent extremist acts of terrorism in Ghana.

b. Minimize the vulnerability of the state and prevent individuals or groups from becoming radicalized, supporting terrorism or other forms of violent extremism.

c. Provide a prompt response to particular terrorist threats and acts of terrorism whenever they ensue.

**NATIONAL RESPONSE**

1.13 The NAFPCVET operates through four mutually reinforcing pillars, namely:

a. **Prevent:** Measures to prevent violent extremist and terrorist attacks by addressing the root causes, minimizing vulnerability and building resilience.

b. **Pre-empt:** Activities to detect and deter the violent extremist and terrorist threat.

c. **Protect:** Measures to protect vulnerable infrastructure and spaces.

d. **Respond:** Activities to mitigate the impact and recover from violent extremist activities and terrorist incidents.

*Figure 1.1: Key Elements of Ghana’s Counter Terrorism Framework.*

**Note:** The Four Pillars *(also known as the PPPR of the Framework)* are represented in Figure 1 and further explained in the subsequent sections.
CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

1.14 For the purpose of this document, the terms violent extremism terrorism, insurgency, anti-terrorism and counter insurgency will be defined as follows:

a. **Extremism.** The term “extremism” refers to the rejection of generally accepted societal beliefs, norms and way of life in preference to an alternative.

b. **Violent Extremism.** The term “violent extremism” refers to justification, support and use of violence to achieve a goal, normally political, social, religious or ideological. Violent extremist views can manifest in connection with a range of issues, including politics, religion and gender.

c. **Terrorism.** Terrorism constitutes politically-motivated criminal violence perpetrated by clandestine groups domestically and internationally. The UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines of terrorism as “criminal acts, including against civilian, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, or taking hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.” Also the Anti-Terrorism Act 2008 of Ghana as amended in 2014 defines terrorism as “an act which is performed in furtherance of a political, ideological, religious, racial or ethnic cause and causes bodily harm to a person, causes serious damage to property, endangers a person’s life, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, involves the use of firearms, or explosives, releases into the environment or exposes the public to dangerous, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance, toxic chemicals or microbial or other biological agents or toxins or any act which is prejudicial to national security or public safety.” This act may also be designed to disrupt a computer system or the provision of services directly related to communications, banking or financial services, utilities, transportation or other essential services or is designed or intended to cause damage to essential infrastructure.
d. **Anti-Terrorism.** This is defined as operations that include offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to violent extremist and terrorist threats.

e. **Counter Terrorism.** Counter Terrorism incorporates the practice, military tactics, techniques, and strategy that government, military, law enforcement, business, and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism.

f. **Insurgency.** This refers to an organized armed struggle by a group aimed at weakening the authority of the Republic of Ghana in order to force a political change through the propagation of extremist ideology, under the guise of political and economic marginalization.

g. **Counter Insurgency.** This refers to the range of military, political and socio-economic measures adopted by a state in response to the outbreak of insurgency. It involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure field of disciplines. A counter insurgent campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive and stability operations conducted along multiple lines. Other lines may be economical, socio-political, educational, religious and information lines of operations carried out by different government ministries, departments and agencies.
SECTION TWO

PILLAR ONE: PREVENT

INTRODUCTION

2.1. The Prevent pillar is concerned with the medium to long-term measures of addressing radicalization and tackling the underlying governance issues that create conditions for identified groups (the youth, unemployed, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups) to engage in extremism and acts of violent extremism and terrorism. The objectives of the Prevent pillar shall be to:

a. To prevent radicalization of the youth and the vulnerable through sustained efforts at addressing governance challenges;
Section 2

b. Introduce education and awareness creation about the implications of extremism and terrorism on individuals, families and the State;
c. Counter violent extremist ideology from mutating into terrorism; and
d. Address the underlying socio-economic and governance challenges that lead to violent extremism and terrorism.

PREVENTING RADICALIZATION OF VULNERABLE GROUPS

2.2. Preventing radicalization aims at addressing the underlying governance issues that create conditions for the identified groups (the youth, unemployed, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups) to engage in violent extremism and acts of terrorism. Although not comparable to other West African countries, inter-faith and intra-faith radicalization exist in the country. Moreover, while doctrinal and interpretational differences are key underlining factors in the radicalization process, its mutation into violence is largely underpinned by governance challenges.

2.3. Among others, poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, marginalization and corruption are key governance issues that underpin the growing radicalization, extremism and acts of terrorism. As such, the MNS and the Ministry of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) shall liaise with the responsible ministries and agencies to specifically ensure government policies are aimed at addressing these challenges.

2.4. Governance practices shall, therefore, aim at promoting inclusiveness and fight against corruption, marginalization and ethnic exclusion. Ghana’s vibrant democratic environment constitutes its greatest assets and best defence against violent extremism. The decentralization process, the District Assembly Common Fund initiative and constitutional provisions ensuring regional balance in the appointment of ministers of state must be maintained and strengthened.

2.5. Other national interventions that are targeted at developing selected underdeveloped regions and communities are key in addressing developmental gaps in the country. Such interventions, if properly prosecuted, will bridge the gap between the broad masses of Ghanaians who are poor and few who are rich.
2.6. Gender mainstreaming in political and governance processes should also be given prominence to bridge the gap between men and women and also boys and girls. Such inclusive policies retain the potential to render extremist narratives of discrimination and marginalization (ethnic, cultural or religious) unattractive.

2.7. More crucial is that de-radicalization programmes shall be developed to change the minds of the youth who are increasingly getting radicalized through wrongful religious teachings and interpretations, self-radicalization and the cyberspace. Based on early warning signs, there shall be specific and targeted counter-radicalization programmes that seek to change the heart and mind of the youth from being radicalized. Such programmes will constitute an effective early response to prevent radicalized groups mutating into violent extremists and terrorists, either in the country or in the region, and from joining external global networks.

EDUCATION AND AWARENESS CREATION

2.8. There are limited education and lack of awareness about the causes, motivations, dynamics and implications of terrorism to individuals, communities and the State. As a result, key actors in education and awareness creation, including the Ministry of Information, Ministry of Education, educational institutions, religious/traditional institutions, CSOs and the media will have to play various roles in education and awareness creation on how to counter the narratives of extremists in the country.

2.9. The Ministry of Information shall have the overarching responsibility in education and awareness creation and collaboration with the security agencies to limit the effects of violent extremist propaganda by:

a. Educating the citizenry on how to address radicalization in all phases, including pre-radicalization, self-radicalization, indoctrination and violent extremism;

b. Exposing false claims in extremist narratives;

c. Promoting messages that uphold core national values and encouraging opinion leaders to speak out and promote inter-faith dialogue to delegitimize extremist groups;
d. Waging media campaigns aimed at educating and reassuring the public on the collective responsibility to safeguard and protect the unity of the State;
e. Sensitizing the media not to be unwilling transmitters of images and narratives that encourage the youth to engage in acts of extremism and terrorism;
f. Encouraging the Ministry of Education to set standards for the training of Muslims and Christian clerics;
g. Adopting measures such as restricting access and removing contents in identified websites and social media accounts to fight internet radicalization; and
h. Engaging agencies and Internet Service Providers to limit the availability of terrorist propaganda.

2.10. The Ministry of Education and educational institutions shall focus on skills and sports development. Provision of education through schools, clubs and community associations, coupled with skills development, especially for the youth, are important preventive measures against the rising level of violent extremism. To this end, the recommended approach is for authorities to:

a. Review existing school curricula to instil critical thinking, civic responsibility and provide entrepreneurship education;
b. Review the curricula content of religion-based institutions;
c. Establish standards for setting up of private religious schools;
d. Implement Free and Compulsory education up to the secondary level to fight poverty and social marginalization;
e. Organize youth in sports development, etc.
f. Promote an atmosphere of cultural and religious tolerance in public schools; and

Section 2


g. Prevent stigmatization and discriminatory profiling of minorities.
2.11. **Civil Society Organizations (CSOs):** Through workshops, seminars and community development programmes, CSOs shall educate the youth and the vulnerable about the dangers associated with extremism and how to counter the creeping narratives in targeted communities. Further, they shall complement the effort of the NSC to explain the security consequences of terrorist attacks and the implications of the involvement of the youth to their families, communities and the State at large.

2.12. **The Media:** The media shall use their platforms (print and electronic media, local and national TV and community radio stations) to educate the citizenry about extremism and methods of recruitment. Media education and awareness creation shall emphasize how to counter online radicalization. The activities of both the government and private media shall be monitored and sanctions enforced by the National Media Commission (NMC).

2.13. **Religious and Traditional Leaders:** Religious and traditional leaders are influential people in Ghanaian societies. They, thus, have the responsibility to use local mechanisms and religious teachings to inculcate in the youth traditional and moral values as they grow into adulthood. Given the linkage of extreme version of Islam and terrorism and the involvement of Muslims in terrorist acts in West Africa, Muslim clerics in particular should place emphasis on teaching the youth certain Islamic concepts such as Jihad and how they have been misconstrued, misinterpreted, hijacked and misapplied by terrorists, bearing in mind the sensitivities related to religious issues. Traditional leaders shall also employ local mechanisms of maintaining peace and peaceful co-existence between and among communities and ethnic groups.
SECTION THREE

PILLAR TWO: PRE-EMPT

INTRODUCTION

3.1. The Pre-empt pillar will consist of short term measures aimed at halting terrorist threats and attacks on Ghana and her interests. This will involve undertaking several activities with the view of detecting and disrupting possible terrorist acts in the country. The objectives of the pre-empt pillar will be to:

   a. Enhance the capabilities, cooperation and coordination of the security and intelligence agencies to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorist crimes.
   b. Disrupt the potential threat of violent extremism and terrorism before they are executed.
   c. Disrupt the financing of violent extremism and terrorist acts; and
   d. Ensure rapid response to terrorist threats based on early warning signs.
NATIONAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND TERROR RISK ASSESSMENT

3.2. Establishing a National Early Warning System (NEWS) or Analysis and Assessment Directorate under the Ministry of National Security (MNS) that assesses the risk of a terrorist attack is a critical first step to pre-empt any possible occurrence. In the context of this framework, the risk assessment shall consist of tools adopted to make the best possible predictions about the likely occurrence of terrorist acts both resulting from internal security dynamics as well as regional and global happenings. Key components of the assessment should be to understand the level of threat (Low, High and Critical) as may be defined by the MNS, vulnerability and the likely consequences of a terrorist attack in the country.

3.3. The NEWS shall be broad-based, recognising the role of international actors and intelligence agencies. At the national level, the system shall rely on the 1996 Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, (Act 526) as amended, that establishes National, Regional and District Security Councils of the Country. The councils shall serve as the internal sources of information gathering across the sixteen (16) administrative regions of the country, which will feed into the NEWS.

3.4. With the hindsight of the underwear bomber experience in 2009, the BNI with other agencies shall mount surveillance on suspicious persons. They shall monitor emerging traces of radicalisation, extremism and terror-related activities by collecting, analyzing and interpreting intelligence gathered in the various regions and districts across the country.

3.5. The NEWS and the Analysis and Assessment section of the MNS shall further analyse the intelligence gathered and submit an accurate and timely assessment of the NSC for the necessary actions to be taken. Based on the level of threat identified (low, moderate, substantial, severe and critical), the intervention could be either a short-term introduction of administrative measures, policy directives, rapid deployment or a long-term review of the existing legislative framework.
3.6. However, the success of intelligence gathered will be contingent upon sharing of regular information among the intelligence and security agencies, both home and abroad. Consequently, the establishment of the National Database of Suspected Terrorists is strongly recommended. The Database shall be on a virtual platform, where information is shared and can be assessed at any given time by the identified agencies for analysis and rapid response.

3.7. The MNS shall be responsible for the Database and for ensuring the quality of terrorist threat analysis. And where the level of threat justifies it, the Minister responsible shall brief the President and Cabinet for necessary emergency actions to be deployed.

3.8. At the regional and international levels, the BNI in conjunction with other agencies shall pay particular attention to migratory inflows of foreign nationals, especially those from well-known terrorist countries. It shall also deepen its liaison with the Research Unit of Foreign Affairs to get background information on suspicious individuals who apply for visas to enter the country. Based on domestic and external early warning signs, the MNS shall task the appropriate state institutions to develop short and long term interventions to respond to the threats in the country.

3.9. However, the effectiveness of any such intervention will be dependent on the established and effective response mechanism. As such, the early response mechanism should be clearly articulated and the supporting resources made available. In this regard, the Ministry of Information in consultation with the MNS will communicate to key state institutions and the citizens in general about the threat and what is being done to manage a given situation.

3.10. The following agencies and others that may be deemed necessary shall be considered as part of NEWS:

  b. Ghana Police Service.
  c. Ghana Immigration Service.
  d. Ghana National Fire Service.
  e. Bureau of National Investigation.
3.11 Increased collaboration is also required between National Intelligence Agencies and international actors. To this end, it is important for BNI and the Research Department to have a good bilateral link with partner services for sharing sensitive intelligence. Such collaboration will seek to access vital information on the threat level in other parts of the globe and inform what decisions need to be taken at the national level.

Key recommended action plan include:

a. Establishment of National Counter Terrorism Operational Centre as part of the NCTC at the MNS.

b. Establish a National Terrorist Database.

c. Regular sharing of information and accessibility by all identified security and intelligence agencies.

d. Monitoring the entry of radical elements into the country.

**TERRORIST FINANCING**

3.12 Potential sources of funds for financing terrorism in the country include money laundering and drug trafficking. As a result, and especially in response to money laundering, a number of Acts exist in the country to disrupt financing of terrorist activities, including the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749) and the 2010 Organised Crime Act, which address issues including; provision on financing, recruitment and supporting terrorist activities as well as confiscation and repatriation of terrorist funds and assets. Additionally, the Bank of Ghana(BoG) and Financial...
Intelligence Centre (FIC) have developed anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) guidelines for banks and non-bank financial institutions in Ghana based on the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2011(L.i.1987).

3.13. Thus, preventing the financing of terrorist activities requires the effective implementation of the laws by the relevant agencies. It would thus be necessary for the relevant agencies to detect, impede and cut terrorist financial inflows through the following mechanisms:

a. Disrupt violent extremist and terrorist networks from accessing illegal funds.


c. Increase cooperation with financial intermediaries to recognise and prevent the financing of terrorism.

d. Regulate money transfer services and informal money exchange/transfer businesses.

e. Regulate the activities of religious NGOs through the creating of a National Commission to coordinate relief and Charity work.

f. Pass a bill to enable the interception of communications.
SECTION FOUR

PILLAR THREE: PROTECT

INTRODUCTION

4.1. The purpose of the Protect pillar is to strengthen important physical infrastructure and spaces against violent extremist and terrorist attacks. It is aimed at reducing vulnerabilities and improving resilience. Our vulnerabilities include Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), crowded places, borders, cyberspace and our transport system. Increasingly, a lot of the CNI is becoming privately owned and the Government of Ghana will work with the private sector to reduce vulnerability across the country. So far, Ghana has not suffered any major attack on its CNI, however, a lot more needs to be done to ensure full protection.
The objective of the Protect strand of this framework will be to:

- Reduce to the minimum the vulnerabilities of Critical National Infrastructure,
- Improve security at crowded places, including the malls, sports complexes, recreational centres, worship centres, educational and health institutions,
- Safeguard Ghana’s borders through credible intelligence sharing among security agencies and contiguous countries,
- Reduce the vulnerability of the transport system; and
- Amend or review counter-terrorism related legislations where necessary to enhance Ghana’s ability to protect its citizens and critical infrastructure.

**REDUCING THE VULNERABILITIES OF CRITICAL NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

4.2. Increasing, violent extremist and terrorist groups are targeting critical national infrastructure and installations which are critical to the very survival of nations. Over the years, Ghana has built and developed several such critical infrastructure/installations, including water treatment, energy generation and distribution, security, telecommunications networks, ports and harbours, financial institutions and many others as will be identified as such. While this critical infrastructure contributes significantly to Ghana’s socio-economic transformation, they also constitute targets for terrorists. Identifying the vulnerabilities of these critical infrastructures and developing holistic plans to reduce those vulnerabilities is essential to prevent possible attacks.

4.3. Whereas intelligence gathering is key in this regard, analyzing the relative vulnerabilities of the individual infrastructure is equally important in designing effective preventive and protective measures aimed at minimizing possible terrorist attacks. Maintaining physical security presence at the sites of the infrastructure and installations will also be significant. However, the number of security persons at such sites should vary dependent on the level of threat at any given time.
SECURING CROWDED PLACES

4.4. Terrorists and Violent Extremists are increasingly targeting areas where maximum casualties could be achieved in the event of an attack. Hence, adequate security measures must be put in place to protect people in public and crowded places such as malls, sports complexes, airports, recreational centres, churches, mosques, educational and health institutions across the country. The security measures must be regularly assessed and upgraded when necessary to avert any possible attacks.

4.5. The Ghana Police Service shall on a regular basis provide protective security advice to managers of vulnerable crowded spaces for appropriate measures to be taken to enhance safety.

4.6. Because many crowded spaces are privately owned, it is important for the private sector to understand the risks and vulnerabilities to mitigate possible attacks. Therefore, the police will provide advice to private sector service providers but the responsibility for reducing their weaknesses and improving resilience will remain theirs.

SAFEGUARDING THE NATIONAL BORDERS OF GHANA

4.7. Like all other countries, Ghana shares boundaries with neighbouring countries: Togo on the East, Cote d’Ivoire on the West, Burkina Faso on the North and the Atlantic Ocean on the South. These contiguous boundaries constitute the land and sea borders while the national and local airports form the air borders. In spite of the provision of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement between member states, it is expected that the information on any person entering or exiting the country is properly documented. However, the porous nature of the country’s borders has facilitated the entry of all manner of persons who engage in both legal and illegal activities, including drug trafficking, arms trafficking, trafficking in persons and goods. The ease with which criminally-minded persons enter the country and collaborate with Ghanaians to engage in all sorts of crime shows how vulnerable Ghana would be to illegal entry for terrorist attacks. Border security, therefore, needs to be strengthened on all fronts to prevent a possible terrorist attack in the country.
4.8. Aviation security is key and therefore airports, both international and local, need to be fitted with modern state-of-the-art equipment capable of detecting potential explosives. Aerial surveillance at the perimeter of the airport must also be duly considered to enhance the effectiveness of the security agencies operating at the various airports. In particular, the GIS must improve its intelligence and surveillance systems as well as access to the national database through effective collaboration with regional and international partners to monitor terrorist suspects entering or leaving the country.

4.9. Land and maritime borders will be strengthened through intensification of joint patrols and sharing of intelligence information with neighbouring countries. Such patrols will help detect preparations for a terrorist crime at an early stage and minimize cross border crimes, which are potential precursors for terrorist attacks.

4.10. Ghana has some of its critical oil and gas infrastructure located within the maritime security domain, which is equally susceptible to a terrorist attack. It is important, therefore, to put in place a maritime security strategy to ensure adequate safeguarding of these national assets.

REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM

4.11. Ghana’s public transport system presents a target that can be exploited by terrorists. Security consciousness in this sector is generally low hence a need for increased awareness. The Ministry of Transport, in collaboration with the relevant ministries, state agencies and various private road transport unions and associations, shall, when necessary, organize programmes for awareness creation, training and security.

4.12. The domestic air transport sector in Ghana is a growing one that requires attention. This calls for improved aviation security and safety measures both on the ground and aboard aircrafts. The Ministry of Aviation, working with relevant security agencies, aircraft operators and ground handling and services providers, will continue to advise and improve aviation safety in the country.
ENHANCING CYBER SECURITY

4.13. Enhancing cyber-security is critical to preventing cyber-related criminalities in the country. Over the years, several laws and policies such as the Information Communications and Technology for Accelerated Development (ICT4AD, 2003), Electronic Transactions Act (Act 772, 2008), Data Protection Act and the National Cyber Security Strategy, have been adopted to fight cybercrimes. However, the bigger challenge is how to address the emerging threat of online radicalization, the spread of extremist ideology and the use of the cyberspace to undermine critical national infrastructure.

4.14. The need to reduce cyber vulnerabilities in critical national infrastructure through enhanced cyber security system is critical due to recent developments in the country, including the hacking of Ghana’s official portal, the website of NCA and the website of National Information Technology Agency (NITA). These attacks have further exposed the weakness in Ghana’s cyber infrastructure and space and the extent to which the country is open to bigger terrorist attacks through virtual connectivity, using the internet and intranet.

4.15. The Ministry of Communications, the NCSC, the BNC and the NCA, together with other relevant agencies, must introduce measures to reduce the vulnerability of Ghana’s cyberspace or infrastructure and protect the country from being exploited by terrorist networks.

REVIEW OF ANTI/COUNTER TERRORISM RELATED LEGISLATIONS AND POLICIES

4.16 Legislative frameworks and administrative measures/procedures are important tools in waging war against terrorism. First, several legal frameworks and Acts exist in the country to address terrorism, including provisions on financing, recruitment and supporting of terrorist activities as well as the confiscation and repatriation of terrorist funds and assets. Key among the Acts is the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008 (Act 762) and its subsequent amendment in 2014, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749) and the 2010 Organized Crime Act.
4.17. Given the dynamic and mutating nature of terrorism, there is the need for the existing Intelligence Services and Anti-Terrorism Acts and other related frameworks to undergo periodic reviews and amendments or new legislation to be introduced as and when necessary to respond effectively and decisively to terrorist threats. Such reviews should aim at responding to wider sub-regional developments, covering emerging challenges such as the Foreign Terrorist Fighter phenomenon. Reviews should also seek to empower law enforcement and intelligence agencies to act before terrorist attacks could occur.

4.18. Information interception is critical to gather intelligence and disrupt the plans of terrorists before it is executed. In that regard, there is the urgent need for the passage of the Interception of Communications Law to ensure lawful collection of information for counter-terrorism purposes. Having such a law will ensure that intelligence information is gathered within the confines of the rule of law.
SECTION FIVE

PILLAR FOUR: RESPOND

INTRODUCTION

5.1. While a great deal of effort is being made to prevent terrorist attacks from happening, there must be the readiness to deal with the situation if it occurs. This pillar focuses on the essential measures that should be put in place to effectively halt any type of terrorist attack in any part of the country. The Respond pillar aims to increase Ghana’s resilience to an attack and to enhance its ability to return to normal life as quickly as possible. The objectives of this pillar are:
Section 5

a. To foster coherence between the strategic, operational and tactical level of responses in the event of an attack.
b. To enable the different actors to quickly and effectively act simultaneously to halt a terrorist attack in all forms and manifestations.
c. To strengthen inter-agency coordination mechanisms for assistance delivery, relief operations and victim support in the event of an attack.
d. To limit the societal consequences of a terrorist attack and bring the incident under control.
e. To facilitate effective and honest communication between Government and the general public in the event of a possible or ongoing terrorist attack.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5.2. The capacity for strategic leadership and response in critical situations is vital to managing terrorist attacks. Per its mandate, as stipulated in Article 84 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana and Section 4 of the Security and Intelligence Agencies Act, 1996 (Act 526), the National Security Council (NSC) shall be the coordinating authority in the management of any act of terrorism or emergencies. The NSC will provide the necessary strategic leadership role in all national counter-terrorism activities. The Council shall take appropriate measures to disrupt and neutralize any terrorist threat based on early detection of warning signals through regular risk and vulnerability assessments and timely interventions to save life and property.

5.3. Without prejudice to its wide-ranging powers in Article 84 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, the NSC shall mandate the Ministry of National Security to take, on its behalf, appropriate measures for the implementation of the strategy.
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

5.4. The MNS in collaboration with the relevant ministries and state agencies will coordinate all the National Counter Terrorism Response efforts by the various state agencies and the private sector at all the national and district levels respectively. This responsibility will include:

a. Serving as the link between the NSC at the strategic level and the responding organisations at the operational level.

b. Coordinating intelligence gathering by the intelligence, law enforcement and defence agencies as well as the regional and district security councils for early detection and prevention of attack on land, sea and air.

c. Coordinating resources and operational responses to disrupt or halt terrorist attacks to protect life and property.

d. Leading efforts in consultation with the NSC to conduct counter-terrorism negotiation in cases of hostage-taking.

e. Conducting regular risk and vulnerability assessments as well as issues on threat levels and report to the NSC and relevant agencies for appropriate response to disrupt or neutralise any threats of attack.

f. Coordinating all joint counter-terrorism competency training and capacity development effort by all the various agencies.

g. Coordinating all public sensitization activities by creating a joint counter-terrorism advocacy team involving the GPS, NCCE, National Peace Council, Media, Academia, Local Authorities, CSOs, and Traditional and Local Authorities.

h. Promoting cross-border collaboration and cooperation with Ghana’s immediate neighbours, as well as regional and international partners to detect, deter and defeat any terrorist act.

i. Ensuring the provision of accurate and timely intelligence to responders during an attack in progress or possible attack.

5.5. To effectively perform these responsibilities, the MNS shall establish a NCTC to coordinate all counter terrorism activities.
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES

5.6. Multiple time-crime operations have to be undertaken in the event of an attack to save life and property. The operational collaborators between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, military, emergency services, medical services and other institutions of state will be crucial to successfully deal with an attack. In that regard, institutions such as the GPS, GAF, BNI, RD, BNC, NCSC, Ghana National Fire Service, National Ambulance Service, NADMO, Medical Services and the media all have important roles to play when there is an attack. The readiness and capacity of these agencies to halt or disrupt an attack are vital to stop terrorists from implementing their plan and more importantly, limit the societal consequences of an attack.

5.7. In the wake of any terrorist attack, the primary responsibility of all the security agencies must be to restore law and order. The GPS shall be the lead agency and first responders to, and investigators of terrorist attacks per their mandate as outlined in Article 200 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana and in pursuance of the objectives of the Anti-Terrorism Act 762 (2008) as amended.

5.8. When necessary, the GAF together with other response partners such as the BNI, GIS and the Ghana Prisons Service will be called upon to assist the GPS to restore and maintain law and order. The overall objective will be to restore the confidence of the people and to assure them of their safety and security.

5.9. In the event of an attack, the NADMO shall coordinate all relief efforts of the emergency and medical services in collaboration with the MNS and Ministry of Health.

5.10. All counter terrorism responses by the different agencies shall be coordinated by the NCTC.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

5.11. Institutional and capacity development will focus on developing key state institutions that have a stake in the fight against terrorism to have better and functional
structures with enhanced personnel capacity to deliver on their mandate. Presently, the Counter Terrorism Units of the GPS, GAF and the BNI constitute key national agencies mandated to prevent and counter terrorism from the hardcore security and intelligence perspective. As such, regular capacity building sessions by these agencies is important to make them ever-prepared and ready to combat terrorist threats in the country. The capacity building shall be aimed at modifying training modules and strategies beyond conventional warfare to effectively combat terrorism.

5.12. Inter-agency collaboration between the three units is therefore crucial. At the same time, the GPS, GAF and the GIS Counter Terrorism Units shall collaborate with other security agencies such as the BNI, CID, RD, Ghana Prisons Service and CD-GRA to share and exchange intelligence.

5.13. The capacity of non-security institutions such as academic institutions, religious and traditional institutions as well as selected CSOs whose work border on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism need to be equally enhanced.

5.14. The MNS is responsible for ensuring robust planning, preparations and continuous improvement of the national capability of responders to terrorist attacks and recover from it. There must be a sufficient rehearsal of the response to a terrorist attack to ensure that appropriate command and control protocols are in place, problems and discontinuities are identified and corrected in advance, and for the different organisations to become accustomed to working effectively together. It is important to also improve the interoperability of emergency services and security agencies and ensure that there is sufficient space in the supply of essential services to cope with the loss of one or more components.

**INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND DISSEMINATION**

5.15. Terrorist attacks can cause serious damages, great anxieties and fears in society. To dispel these uncertainties, the MNS in collaboration with relevant state agencies shall establish a mechanism to manage intelligence information and facilitate effective communication between responding agencies, the general public and the
media in the event of an attack or possible attack. In particular, the general public and the media should be provided with accurate, timely and consistent information to build trust and confidence, while preventing misinformation that fuels fear to the general public.

5.16. To prevent the various agencies from sharing different and conflicting information to the public, the GPS in collaboration with the MNS shall coordinate the release of accurate information to the public, media and respond to citizens’ inquiries in the event of an attack. The Ministry of Information will communicate Government decisions and actions to the general public during such periods.

**PROSECUTION**

5.17. Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana will be dealt with strictly under the conditions of the rule of law. Successful implementation of this strategy will require that the prosecutorial powers of the state benefit from effective legislation. Ghana needs to develop a domestic legal system that supports effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences without trampling on the rights of individuals. As per Article 88 of the 1992 Constitution, the Attorney General’s Department will initiate or conclude prosecution of any terrorism case. Where the Department is not able to prosecute, it will delegate other institutions to prosecute cases on its behalf.

5.18. The Government of Ghana is committed to assisting victims of terrorism to use the judicial processes of Ghana to secure convictions for perpetrators and supporters of terrorism. To achieve effective prosecution of terrorist activities is to maintain a strong nationwide network of efficient prosecutors who are well-versed in counter-terrorism measures.

5.19. Where necessary, the Chief Justice of the Republic of Ghana shall establish specialized courts to handle all terrorism-related cases to ensure that there are no delays in dealing with such cases across the country. To effectively deal with terrorism cases, the legal capacity of the Attorney General’s Department and the Judiciary should be developed to be able to investigate and prosecute the full gamut of terrorist offences from planning to the actual execution of the terrorist act.
BUILDING RESILIENCE

5.20. Ghana’s resilience to fighting terrorism and its related activities will be based on its strong communal value system which is grounded in the extended family structure and traditional local cultures. Building a resilient Ghanaian society to tackle terrorism demands the use of our shared common language and institutions, customary law and traditional rites of our various communities. Such strong communal cooperation is vital to identify terrorist networks and prevent the dissemination of violent extremist ideas. The focus of communal participation is to protect the interests of Ghanaians against terrorist threats.

5.21. Another important measure of building resilience will be through the development of the intellectual and human capital needs of all actors at the centre of the fight against terrorism. There is the need to create, build and sustain a community of counter terrorism professionals through multidisciplinary training and refresher courses periodically, to sustain their alertness. Additionally, counter-terrorism training measures will be incorporated into the training curricula of the basic, senior and tertiary levels of our educational system.

5.22. A resilient Ghana is one that can rise above the challenges that terrorist threats possess; one whose institutions of state can withstand the impact and shocks of an attack and be able to quickly return to stability, and one that is able to mobilise its own material and human resources to fight terrorism so that the mass of its people can go about their normal daily activities without fear or panic.
SECTION SIX

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

INTRODUCTION

6.1. The Implementation stage of NAFPCVET involves the various elements working together and cooperating to deal with the threat of violent extremism and terrorism. Much of the work requires partnerships across government agencies and sectors involving the GPS, emergency services, local authorities, REGSECs, DISECs, the National Peace Council of Ghana, Government departments as well as partnerships with businesses in the private sector. The implementation plan of NAFPCVET stipulates how this will be successfully executed by MDAs and the role of non-state actors. The summary of the roles and responsibilities is at Annex A of the NAFPCVET.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6.2 The NSC will provide the requisite strategic leadership role in all national Violent Extremism and Counter Terrorism efforts. The MNS will be the driving tool for these efforts. To minimize vulnerabilities, the MNS has conducted, as part of its risk assessment, an evaluation of the functional state of defence systems around CNI and its implementation.

IMPLEMENTING THE NAFPCVET

6.3 Information Sharing System. The Secretariat of the NSC will develop a single comprehensive database to serve as an information sharing system for the various agencies. The aim is to provide a mechanism where law enforcement, public safety and security agencies can collate their various data bases for a single purpose and easy access. Similar facilities will be created at Regional and District levels and linked to the central system.

6.4 Crime Registry. The GPS will reactivate their respective crime registries immediately and store information digitally for ease of access. The NIA shall ensure that all Ghanaians are identified through biometric data capture and at every opportunity well ahead of any requirements. The GPS will also develop a fingerprint identification system for all persons arrested for any offence, which can also be accessed, centrally by any of the national security and intelligence agencies. The GPS and other counter terrorism outlets will have unrestricted access to the NIA, Population Census and Voter Registration Data Bases.

6.5 Border Management. The NSC will instruct the Ministry of Interior to overhaul the entire border management system to make it more efficient while still supporting legitimate traffic of persons and commerce. The borders will provide greater security through sound intelligence and coordinated national efforts and international cooperation. The Ministry of Interior will also ensure that persons passing through the borders are adequately documented and possess legitimate travel and identity documents. A multi-layer vetting system will be introduced to help ensure the correct identity of persons applying for such documents. The GIS will step up
efforts and cooperation with relevant security agencies, as appropriate, to improve on the security of production and issuance of identity and travel documents, and to prevent or detect any alterations. However, government through the MNS should develop a comprehensive border security system capable of tackling the recurring security challenges stemming from the gaps at the borders of the country.

6.6 **Vetting of Personnel of Security Agencies.** In order to build the capacity of the various security agencies, each service/agency will conduct a comprehensive internal and external screening and vetting of all employees latest by 31st December, 2019 and thereafter forward details to the MNS for final vetting. This process will also be continuous and must apply to all subsequent selection processes. Cross vetting would also be encouraged among the Security and Intelligence Agencies.

6.7 **Ports Security.** In order to prevent undesirable elements from moving in and out of the country or the importation of unauthorized and unlawful items, all the ports of entry will be adequately equipped, manned and secured. The MNS, GPS GIS, CEPS, BNI, GCAA, GPHA, GMA and the GAF have major roles to play, as checks must be thorough and accurately maintained. The roles of the services and agencies are prescribed in the appropriate legislations and regulations of the country.

6.8 **Registration of Vehicles by DVLA.** All vehicles in the country must be registered against an individual or a particular organization. The DVLA should embarked on a total overhaul of the National Vehicle Identification System in order to restore the integrity of the vehicle number plates and enhance its overall security feature in line with global best practices. This is with a view to strengthening their capacity to support the National Security System. The colours of vehicles at the time of registration will also be taken into cognizance. The colour of vehicles must be recorded by the GRSC and the DVLA at the point of registration. No vehicle should be given two registration numbers, except for high-profile security cases, which must be cleared from the MNS. All these will facilitate the tracking of those engaged in terrorism activities.
6.9 **Road Traffic Management.** CCTV is an advanced form of road traffic management, which utilizes the advantages of ICT to monitor, control and track offenders. The effectiveness of CCTV would depend on availability of credible and reliable database for prompt verification of traffic offenders and criminals by security agencies. Such a database should be developed by the Ministry of Transport in collaboration with the MNS. Deployment of CCTVs at critical intersections to run 24 hours of the day and through the week requires a central control room manned by trained personnel from relevant security agencies. It also requires installation of infrastructure to link the CCTV to NRSC and GPS electronic data for purposes of verification and investigation. Public and private organizations, individuals and corporate bodies should be encouraged to provide CCTVs in their areas of operation (shops, schools, restaurants, hotels, parks, filling stations, etc). Access should also be granted to law enforcement agencies when required. The NCCE is to embark on a nationwide campaign to promote this initiative to complement government efforts.

6.10 **Arms and Ammunition Certificate.** The MNS will ensure a strict control of end user’s certificate for arms, ammunition, explosives and accessories specified CT scanning equipment and other military related hardware being imported into the country. A periodic review of the list of items will be made from time to time.

6.11 **Immigrant House Workers.** The GIS in each locality, with the support of the GPS and the MNS will register all foreign house-helps in Ghana irrespective of the provision of the ECOWAS and the AU treaties.

6.12 **Foreign Construction Workers.** The GIS, with the support of the GPS and MNS, will register all foreign construction and casual workers in Ghana irrespective of the provision of the ECOWAS and the AU treaties.

6.13 **Prevention of Local Bomb-Making.** In order to control and minimize the availability of bomb making materials, the MNS, GPS, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Minerals Commission of Ghana, Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and other Law Enforcement Agencies shall strengthen measures to
monitor and control the sale, distribution and use of materials that can be used in making IEDs. The MNS in collaboration with other Security Agencies are to develop a Counter-IED Strategy for Ghana.

6.14 **Registration of Births and Deaths.** All births and deaths must henceforth be registered from Ward to State level irrespective of location by the NIA. Mechanisms shall be put in place to strengthen existing health data collection systems and ensure the compliance of all concerned. The data so gathered will be maintained centrally by the NDPC as well as the National Population Council, which can be accessed by the GPS and other stakeholders.

6.15 **Threat of Cyber.** The Internet was created primarily to enhance unregulated and unlimited access to commercial, social and educational opportunities. The cyberspace has, however, been used by criminal elements to perpetrate crimes that range from advance fee fraud, business espionage, identity theft, banking fraud, outright attacks on data in computer networks, radicalization and recruitment of terrorists. The Ministry of Communications is to lead all relevant Agencies and Stakeholders to develop mechanisms in order to control the activities of cyber criminals. A National Cyber Strategy (NCS) should be developed by the Ministry of Communications to address all cyber related threats.

6.16 **Coordination of Prosecutions.** The Law Enforcement Agencies in Ghana shall be responsible for the gathering of intelligence and investigations of violent extremist and activities and terrorist acts while prosecution efforts will be coordinated by the Office of the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice. This is to ensure fair and speedy trial of violent extremism and terrorism-related cases.

6.17 **Disaster Response.** In order to minimize the effects of terrorism attacks when they happen, NADMO, as the coordinating agency, will ensure that designated Disaster Response Units are created. NADMO is to constantly engage in joint training activities on their roles and coordination to be facilitated by NADMO. On all occasions, non-security and intelligence departments, especially the Ministry of Health, must be represented on such activities.
6.18 **Rapid Reaction Force.** Security Agencies and the GAF have, in recent times, developed counter-terrorism capabilities with assistance from development partners. Employing the capabilities jointly for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism requires that they be organized and coordinated. The MNS and the Ministries of Interior and Defence will therefore ensure the availability of a dedicated force for swift reaction and efficient handling of violent extremism and counter-terrorism situations at any part of the country.

6.19 **Securing National Maritime Territory.** The shipping industry and oil and gas installations are confronted daily by diverse threats. This has become a major challenge, which the GMA, the Ghana Navy and other maritime security agencies have to contend with. Piracy, illegal bunkering and terrorism are also known threats. The nature of Ghana’s maritime area should be of concern to government. However, the support of other maritime agencies will be needed to complement the efforts of the Ghana Navy and GMA in order to improve the security of shipping and oil installations. The gaps between the security establishments and bases along the coastlines must be bridged with the development of coastal radars and the deployment of more operational platforms to ensure effective coverage of Ghana’s maritime territory. The Ghana Navy should be equipped with Special Boat Service vital for combating maritime terrorism. Additionally, the Ghana Navy should be equipped with specialized boats, weapons, and sensors for more effective performance. Furthermore, intelligence gathered and details of arrests made at sea must be domiciled in the national information sharing system at the MNS. There is a need therefore to incorporate the Ghana Air Force maritime surveillance assets in liaison with GMA for maritime surveillance duties. A National Maritime Strategy (NMS) under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport and MNS should be developed to identify all maritime threats and to incorporate all measures to prevent and counter terrorist activities.

6.20 **Alarm Schemes.** To ensure security alertness of the populace, the NCTC at the MNS in collaboration with the Ministry of Information and the NCCE will develop public enlightenment strategies that will sensitize the public on security awareness. The plan will include extensive use of the media to educate the masses,
continued checks and monitoring of threat levels, issuance of threat level indicators and liaison with relevant Security and Law Enforcement Agencies towards working out measures against violent extremism and terrorism threats.

6.21 **Countering Extremist Ideologies.** The NCTC at the MNS will have an elaborate programme to counter extremist ideologies through print and electronic media, online and advocacy platforms. This will institutionalize strategic communication within the curriculum of GAF, GPS and other security agencies training institutions. It will also develop a national identity plan that focuses on education, in particular the school curriculum to enforce skills as well as ethnic and religious unity.

6.22 **Monitoring Radicalization.** Radicalization can influence acts of faith-based terrorism in Ghana. To address this potential trend, the MNS will develop measures towards counter radicalization and de-radicalization of extreme ideologies. The Government will carry out effective monitoring of the radicalization processes and its indicators, systematic identification of the highly vulnerable groups for assimilation into the society, and launching of anti-radicalization campaigns. The MNS in liaison with religious and other Stakeholders will also develop programmes on counter radicalization and de-radicalization of fundamentalists and extremists.

6.23 **Justice Division for Counter Terrorism.** To promote the Criminal Justice System for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism, the Ministry of Justice shall create in its structure a dedicated Counter Terrorism Division in order to drive the desired reform. To improve the law enforcement capability of the Security Agencies, the Ministry of Justice will periodically organize workshops for all the relevant Stakeholders to review national legislation on violent extremism and terrorism, provide advice on drafting enabling laws, and provide in-depth assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies on the implementation of the legislation against terrorism. The Ministry of Justice will also ensure the development of an integrated criminal justice database, a direct line of interaction among the Director of Public Prosecutions, the GPS, the Ghana Prison Service, MNS and other law enforcement agencies to strengthen and guide investigations and avoid instances where crucial evidence is compromised.
6.24 **Emergency Response Teams.** The Ministry of Health at the National, Regional and District levels is to establish robust Emergency Disaster Response Teams (EDRT) in their various areas of responsibilities. The teams will be adequately equipped to manage physical and psychological cases arising from terrorism-induced incidents, among others. The Ministry of Health and MNS are also to ensure the provision of National Emergency Communication Centre (NECC), which will be located with the MNS and function on 24-hour basis.

6.25 **Fusion Centre for Counter Terrorism.** There shall be developed a toll-free Fusion Centre for CT located at the MNS for citizens to pass information anonymously on terrorism activities for security agencies. The Fusion Centre will function on 24-hour daily basis. A similar centre shall be replicated at all Regional capitals under the control of REGSECs and DISECs respectively.
7.1 Violent Extremist activities and Terrorist attacks across some African countries and especially some of the immediate neighbours of Ghana and the Sahel serve as a reminder of the continued threat that terrorism poses to the people of Ghana. The government of Ghana is determined take the necessary measures to preserve the safety and security of its citizens. The National Framework for the Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism is aimed at ensuring that a secured and safe environment is always assured for all. Strategies have been outlined in this document to prevent and combat violent extremist groups and any terrorists who threatens the security of Ghana. A well-defined inter-agency approach for preventing and countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism will be implemented to ensure the security of the country. This document is therefore a reflection of
Government’s resolve that extremist groups and terrorists and those who sponsor them have no space to operate in the country. The framework also provides for measures to protect Critical National Infrastructure.

7.2 The National Security Council is to establish structures that will address situations that permit violent extremist groups and terrorist groups to operate in Ghana. These measures include reforms within the national security apparatus. The MNS has been tasked to develop adequate information sharing systems in order to enhance synergy amongst the security agencies, MDAs and Civil Society Organisations. A National Counter Terrorism Centre with a Fusion Operations Centre is to be established within MNS to coordinate all Violent Extremism and Terrorism activities. The National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism addresses the critical economic, political and social measures required to engineer and assist the fight against terrorism. The Framework addresses issues of inequality, marginalisation of groups, access to education and healthcare, stimulating economic development, enhancing religious tolerance and discouraging ethnic divisions. The Framework outlines specific tasks for the security agencies as well as government Ministries, Departments and Agencies; and Non-State Actors including Civil Society Organisations and Religious Groups. The overall aim of the framework for preventing and countering violent extremism and terrorism is to assure citizens of the Government of Ghana’s commitment to creating a secured environment.
ANNEX A

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MINISTRIES

1. MINISTRY OF NATIONAL SECURITY (MNS)

The MNS is to provide the requisite leadership role in all national violent extremism and CT efforts and drive the NAFPCVET. The MNS will maintain a comprehensive list of the country's Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) and formulate a policy for its protection. MNS will ensure synergy among the BNI, RD, BNC, GPS, GAF and other Stakeholders. The MNS is to coordinate and ensure oversight of response units in the respective Services. The Ministry will develop a single and comprehensive database to serve as an information sharing system for the various agencies. The Ministry will also ensure stricter control from the issue of End-user Certificates for arms, ammunition, explosives, CT scanning equipment and other military security-related hardware. In conjunction with other ministries and agencies, the MNS will use the media to educate the public on threat levels including issuance of threat level indicators and liaise with the Services/Agencies towards the mitigation of terrorism threats. The MNS will also develop a benchmarking framework for the evaluation of the implementation and review of NAFPCVET.
2. **MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR**

The Ministry of Interior shall support the NAFPCVET by providing oversight for Law Enforcement, Immigration, Passport Control, Disaster Management, Prison Administration, Narcotics Control and the Fire Service. The Ministry will ensure that there is an appropriate upgrade of the entire border security management system in all the frontiers of the country and drive the protection of CNI.

3. **MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

The Ministry of Defence will support the NAFPCVET by appropriately equipping the GAF to confront emerging terrorist threats. In the event of an attack that may exceed the capacity of civil response, the Ministry shall support the Pre-empt, Protect and Respond aspects of the NAFPCVET through the appropriate Military operations in coordination with the MNS and the NCTC.

4. **MINISTRY OF FINANCE**

The Ministry of Finance will support the NAFPCVET with requisite budgetary allocation for all activities for the prevention and countering violent extremism and terrorism based on short, medium and long term strategies. The Ministry will coordinate and provide policy direction to the FIC to track down suspicious terrorist financing and currency transactions into the country. The Ministry will also provide adequate resources for the implementation of human security interventions identified in deprived communities as a prevention mechanism against radicalization of the youth by potential extremists in rural communities.

5. **MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration in conjunction with the Research Department, has overall responsibility for the coordination and delivery of NAFPCVET overseas. The Ministry shall deploy instruments of diplomacy to enhance the implementation of the NAFPCVET in all international engagements undertaken on behalf of the Ghana Government.

6. **MINISTRY OF JUSTICE**

The Ministry of Justice shall assign a dedicated section for the MNS that will ensure that there is a significant capacity in the Criminal Justice System to deal with violent extremism and terrorism cases efficiently, effectively and securely. Partner with
relevant ministries and bodies to introduce legislation that criminalizes incitement and recruitment in places of religious training and worship. The Ministry will collaborate with the judiciary to ensure fair and speedy trial of violent extremism and terror suspects in accordance with the rule of law and develop an integrated criminal justice database and provide leadership in the development of a coordinated approach to investigation and prosecution of violent extremism and terror cases among the Attorney General’s Department, the GPS and other Law Enforcement Agencies.

7. **MINISTRY OF ENERGY**

The Ministry of Energy will support the NAFPCVET as lead ministry for all energy and petroleum matters. The Ministry shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the nation’s oil production and petroleum supplies and distribution of oil and gas assets. The Ministry is also responsible for ensuring adequate security for general transmission and distribution of electricity and speedy restoration of damaged infrastructure as well as back-up mechanism in case of terror-related breaches. The security of all critical power infrastructure including the Hydro Generating Stations, Thermal Plants, Gas Processing Plants, Electricity Sub-Stations and Power Control Centres should be well protected in coordination with Volta River Authority, Ghana Grid Company Limited (GRIDCO), Ghana Gas Company, the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and other relevant bodies including the private sector. The Ministry shall develop a National Energy Strategy to address all energy-related threats.

8. **MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS**

The Ministry of Communications as the responsible ministry for cyber security shall provide the appropriate guidelines and policies for the protection of the cyberspace of Ghana against extermist elements and terrorist activities. The Ministry is to lead relevant Agencies and Stakeholders to develop mechanisms in order to apprehend and control the activities of cyber criminals. A National Cyber Security Strategy should be developed by the Ministry to address all cyber related threats. The Ministry shall coordinate the activities of the NCA, NIA and the NCSC to support the NAFPCVET.

9. **MINISTRY OF HEALTH**

The Ministry of Health shall, put in place mechanisms to strengthen existing health data collection systems. The Ministry shall set up institutions to develop skills for the identification and counselling of vulnerable persons who are at the threshold of being
radicalized, including other facilities nationwide and provide emergency preparedness and response support to deal with emergencies arising from catastrophic acts of terrorism. The need to coordinate and collaborate with the National Ambulance Service is relevant for all regions, districts and local areas in the country.

10. **MINISTRY OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE**
The Ministry of Food and Agriculture will contribute to the NAFPCVET by promoting the development of agriculture to attain food and crop sufficiency and to generate employment. The Ministry shall also take measures to ensure food security in Ghana. The Ministry will coordinate with various actors in formulating policies for the production of fertilizer and control the distribution and usage of fertilizer products as part of counter IEDs strategy.

11. **MINISTRY OF INFORMATION**
The Ministry shall work with other stakeholders to develop information strategies to disrupt terrorist media campaigns at local and international levels. The Ministry will develop an Information Assurance and Awareness strategy and collaborate with stakeholders to combat the spread of radical extremist messages.

12. **MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIES**
The Ministry of Trade and Industries will collaborate with the Ministry of Information to organized the private sector and other related associations to promote a friendly investment atmosphere and develop trade guidelines that will discourage terrorist financing and illicit transactions.

13. **MINISTRY OF AVIATION**
The Ministry of Aviation is responsible for the air transport policies to enhance the security of air operations through continuous response to identified threats and security needs. The Ministry shall collaborate with the MNS and other security related ministries to ensure the security of all airports in the country. The Ministry shall develop a National Strategy for protecting all airports in the country.

14. **MINISTRY OF TRANSPORTATION**
The Ministry of Transport is responsible for national transportation policies and programmes and shall enhance the security of the entire transportation system
in the country including road, rail and maritime through continuous response to identified threats and security needs. The Ministry will adopt a risk management approach and develop measures designed to mitigate vulnerabilities and threats in the transportation system. The Ministry shall ensure a National Maritime Strategy is developed to enhance maritime security in the country.

15. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
The Ministry of Education will support the Prevent and Pre-empt pillars of the NAFPCVET by providing an enabling environment for education to be free from, and devoid of, any form of extremist ideology. The Ministry will develop curricula to address needs consistent with national unity and human development objectives at the grassroots. This should include a robust civic education programme at all schools levels. The Ministry will introduce a process where education administrators and practitioners are trained to identify and counsel pupils/students who are exposed to radicalisation.

16. MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The Ministry will ensure environmental protection and conservation of natural resources. The Ministry is responsible for dealing with, and managing the impact of, terrorist incidents on the environment, plants and animal health, food and drinking water, waste management, farming, fisheries and communities in the event of a terrorist attack. The National Environment Agency and Ghana Atomic Energy Commission may be used to initiate guidelines to prevent and counter terrorism.

17. MINISTRY OF GENDER, CHILDREN AND SOCIAL PROTECTION
The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection shall ensure proper provision, coordination and regulation of support in collaboration with the Department of Social Welfare to all categories of women, children, persons with disabilities, families and other vulnerable groups to prevent imbibing terrorist ideologies. The Ministry shall also help the Department of Social Welfare to develop resistance in handling and managing social welfare services for victims in welfare centres and institutions for rehabilitation, re-unification and proper re-integration into the society. The Ministry shall also develop gender mainstreaming strategies to bridge the gap between
men and women and also boys and girls. Such strategies should aim at rendering extremist narratives of discrimination and marginalization unattractive.

18. **MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT**

The Ministry of Labour and Employment will support the NAFPCVET with efforts aimed at generating employment for Ghanaians and drive skill acquisition processes at all levels. This will provide platform for economic self-actualization among the general populace and the youth as it will go a long way in helping to reduce exposure to the tenants of radicalization.

19. **MINISTRY OF YOUTH AND SPORTS**

The Ministry of Youth and Sports will develop a comprehensive framework to cater for the needs of underage children and introduce a coordinating mechanism for empowerment programmes in Agriculture, in conjunction with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture through skill acquisition, vocational studies and counseling. The Ministry will introduce sporting activities, in collaboration with the National Sports Council to provide a favourable platform for engaging youths and other street children to desist from violent extremism. The Ministry shall use the National Youth Agency and the Youth Employment Agency initiatives as tools of engagement to build community cohesion and resilience. The Ministry will also collaborate with the Ministry of Zongo Affairs to develop viable programmes in the Zongo communities in the country.

20. **MINISTRY OF CHIEFTAINCY AND RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS**

The Ministry of Chieftaincy and Religious Affairs shall support the NAFPCVET with programmes to educate all Chiefs, Queenmothers and Religious leaders on the implications of extremism ideology from mutating into terrorism. The Ministry shall solicit the support of Chiefs and Religious groups to help prevent the radicalization of the youth and the vulnerable in the communities, the churches and mosques. Specifically, the entry point for engagement shall be through the leadership of the National House of Chiefs, Catholic Bishops Conference, Christian Council, Ghana Pentecostal Council, National Council for Christian and Charismatic Churches, Ahamadiyya Muslim Mission, Al-Sunnah Muslims, Tijaaniya Muslim Group, practitioners of African Traditional Religion and other groupings.
1. **GHANA POLICE SERVICE (GPS)**

The GPS is the lead agency for the maintenance of law and order and the prevention and detection of crime. The GPS is the first responder in the four pillars of the NAFPCVET with support from other security agencies. The GPS will update the crime registry and store information digitally for easy access, in conjunction with the BNI, RD, NIS, GIS, GCAA, GMA, NIA, NCSC and the Ministries of National Security, Interior and Defence, to ensure that firearms and explosives are not illegally imported and unlawfully used in the country. In collaboration with the BNI, the GPS will maintain and monitor information on quarries and industrial explosive sites in the country. The GPS is to institute measures to monitor and control the sales, distribution and use of materials that may be used in making IEDs. The GPS, in collaboration with the Ministry of Communications, Finance and Defence, shall develop mechanisms to control the activities of cyber criminals.
2. **GHANA ARMED FORCES (GAF)**

The GAF will establish a robust CT Unit and coordinate all the CT efforts with other security agencies. In the event of any terrorist attack that may exceed the capacity of civil response, the GAF shall support the **Pre-empt, Protect and Respond** aspects of the NAFPCVET through the appropriate Military response in coordination with the NCTC and other security agencies. The GAF will use the Defence Intelligence to complement the violent extremist and CT effort of the BNI, GIS, RD and MOD and other relevant agencies as the lead agency for the collation of military-related intelligence within and outside the country. The GAF will make use of all Defence Advisers deployed externally to assist in the collection and gathering of intelligence on suspected extremist and terror related activities aimed at Ghana.

3. **BUREAU OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS (BNI)**

The BNI is to serve as the lead agency on information and Intelligence collection and collation on all components of internal security as well as prevention and detection of violent extremism and terror related activities and crimes. The agency is to reactivate and resuscitate the crime registry for the storage of digital information and collaborate with the Ministry of Information and the NCTC to develop public enlightenment programmes that will sensitize the public. The BNI shall seek the collaboration of the RD, FIC, CID, NCSC and DI in the performance of its tasks.

4. **RESEARCH DEPARTMENT (RD)**

The RD is to serve as the lead agency for external information and intelligence collection and collation and, in conjunction with relevant MDAs, monitor all violent extremism and terror-related activities in the **Pre-empt, Prevent and Protect** strands of the NAFPCVET. The RD shall seek the collaboration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BNI, FIC, NCSC and foreign partners in the performance of its tasks.

5. **BUREAU OF NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS (BNC)**

The BNC will provide secure and reliable communication links using available terrestrial, satellite and other infrastructure to support the operations of security forces and intelligence agencies, in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.
The BNC will also provide communications intelligence, and be responsible for the operation and the maintenance of the shared communications based platform for information collation, dissemination and analysis to counter violent extremist and terrorist activities. The BNC will expand the national call centre for information dissemination to rural communities.

6. **NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY CENTRE (NCSC)**

The NCSC shall be responsible for monitoring the cyberspace to detect the use of cyber by extremist groups and terrorists. The NCSC will alert all intelligence and the security agencies on all activities of cyber terrorists. The NCSC should feed the NCTC on regular basis on suspected activities of terrorists. The NCSC should collaborate with the NCTC, BNI, RD and BNC in all its activities to support the NAFPCVET.

7. **GHANA IMMIGRATION SERVICE (GIS)**

The GIS will control and monitor immigration activities at all entry and exit points in the country and will complement all internal security efforts through effective manning of major entry points as well as the patrolling of land borders. The GIS shall register all foreign house-helps and foreign construction workers in the country and, in conjunction with other agencies, monitor and ensure the control of refugees and refugee camps in the country. A national border security strategy shall be developed by government to guide the GIS on border security.

8. **GHANA REVENUE AUTHORITY- CUSTOMS DIVISION (GRA-CD)**

The GRA-CD will collaborate with other agencies to support and enforce the prevention of illegal importation of arms and ammunition and illicit drugs, including toxic and hazardous substances. The GRA-CD is to provide first-hand intelligence on importation and exportation trends to help contain terrorist threats.

9. **FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (FIC)**

In conjunction with other relevant financial institutions, the FIC is responsible for the receipt and analysis of financial disclosures and currency transactions. The FIC will report suspicious transactions and disseminate financial intelligence to competent authorities including the Joint Intelligence Committee of the NSC.
10. **GHANA PRISONS SERVICE**

The Ghana Prisons Service shall develop capacity for prison personnel and institutions to tackle the issue of de-radicalization of convicted terrorists and those awaiting trials. It shall provide timely information on terrorist cliques detained in prison custody to the relevant stakeholders, provide safe places for captured terrorists and monitor, gather information and provide timely intelligence on suspected terrorist cliques or links that might likely be in prison cells. The Service shall develop a mechanism for prison after-care system for easy reintegration of released prisoners into society and also take measures to prevent confusion and quarrels among prison inmates which may lead to prison break outs.

11. **NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY (NCA)**

The NCA is responsible for the regulation of telecommunication services in the country. The NCA is to ensure the efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum and other scarce communications resources for security operations and civil uses and to effectively detect, disrupt and deter the unauthorized use of radio frequencies in Ghana, expand the national call centre for information dissemination to rural communities and re-invigorate and apply regulations for National Communications. The Authority is to regulate frequencies for radio and TV broadcasts, allocation of frequencies as well as the monitoring of transmissions in consultation with the NMC where necessary. The National Digital Terrestrial Television Transmission Network, the primary platform for Free-to-Air terrestrial TV, is a critical national infrastructure and the NCA must ensure through regulatory and other means that it is secure, reliable and available. The NCA and the Ministry of Communications, together with other relevant agencies, must introduce measures to reduce the vulnerability of Ghana’s cyberspace or infrastructure and protect it from being exploited by terrorist networks.

12. **NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY (NIA)**

The NIA will be responsible for the issuance of identity cards for eligible Ghanaians and legal residents only and maintaining a proper record and database of all categories of persons. The database of the NIA will be relevant for tracking suspected extremists by the intelligence community, the NCTC and the GPS.
13. **BANK OF GHANA (BOG)**

The BOG and FIC are to work closely with the MNS and other security agencies to monitor unusual/suspicious movement of funds most especially as such movements relates to violent extremist groups and terrorism financing.

14. **ECONOMIC AND ORGANISED CRIME OFFICE (EOCO)**

EOCO will collaborate with relevant agencies to investigate financial crimes, money laundering and terrorist financing in support of the Prevent and Pre-Empt pillars of the NAFPCVET.

15. **NARCOTICS CONTROL COMMISSION (NCC)**

The NCC will collaborate with other security agencies and MDA’s to enforce the prevention of the cultivation, production, manufacture, sale, distribution, abuse, importation and exportation of illicit drugs and substances as well as diversion of precursor chemicals for illicit purposes.

16. **GHANA CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY (GCAA)**

The GCAA will be the lead agency on oversight, safety and security of air travel and ensure periodic review of aviation security protocol. The GCAA will support relevant agencies with the screening of air travelers and their baggage as well as educate such agencies on the need for proper screening in the following air security areas:
   a. Pre-board screening.
   b. Hold baggage screening.
   c. Non-passenger screening for restricted areas.
   d. Safety of approaches to airports for safe take-off and landing.
   e. Progressive erection of perimeter fence at airports.

17. **NATIONAL PETROLEUM AUTHORITY (NPA)**

The NPA will ensure security and safety of distribution of petroleum products. In conjunction with other agencies, the NPA will develop a contingency plan against violent extremist activities and terror-related disruptions. The NPA will secure the operation of the downstream and upstream sectors of the petroleum industry.
18. **NATIONAL ROAD SAFETY COMMISSION (NRSC)**
The NRSC is to provide support data for the **Prevent** and **Protect** strands of NAFPCVET.

19. **GHANA RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (GRDA)**
The GRDA has the exclusive right to operate rail services in Ghana. The GRDA helps in generating employment and transportation of goods and services. The GRDA shall also help to prevent the transportation of IEDs and other offensive weapons by terrorists through the railway system.

20. **GHANA PORTS AND HABOURS AUTHORITY (GPHA)**
The GPHA governs and operates all ports in Ghana, including the Tema and Takoradi Ports. Operations of the GPHA are carried out under the Ministry of Transport in conjunction with the Ghana Shippers Council. GPHA will ensure that terrorists do not import or export Improvised IEDs and other offensive materials into the country. GPHA shall develop a security strategy for the protection of all ports in the country.

21. **FOOD AND DRUG AUTHORITY (FDA)**
The FDA is charged with the detection of fake drugs and drug money. The FDA will also ensure the importation of genuine drugs and the distribution of safe drugs devoid of violent extremist and terrorist-induced contamination.

22. **NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION (NADMO)**
NADMO is the coordinating body for disaster management in emergency response in the country. NADMO is to provide appropriate leadership and direction to other relevant agencies on CT response matters to ensure resilience. NADMO will ensure that Disaster Response Teams are created at Regional, District and Local Government areas. NADMO will also coordinate training especially in Disaster Risk Reduction and related efforts and encourage regular joint training activities for stakeholders.

23. **NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CIVIC EDUCATION (NCCE)**
The NCCE is to serve as the information tool, responsible for the education and dissemination of government programmes and activities. With other relevant
agencies, the NCCE will develop security consciousness and situational awareness through concerted media campaigns. The NCCE will engage with the communities to ensure better security through civic education and promote activities that would engender social inclusiveness and community cohesion. The NCCE will identify signs of radicalization early and tag these off into early warning machinery. The NCCE will embark on a nationwide campaign to promote the installation of CCTV by public and private organizations, individuals and corporate bodies as a prevention measure against terrorist activities.

24. **NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL (NPC)**

The NPC shall support the NAFPCVET with programmes and engagements to help build resilience against violent extremism and terrorism in the country. The NPC would be encouraged to organise activities to prevent radicalization of the youth and vulnerable groups through sustained efforts to prevent extremism activities. The NPC using the Regional and District Peace Councils shall partner CSOs to coordinate preventive educational awareness programmes in the various communities and local areas focusing on the promotion of dialogue and tolerance.

25. **CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (CSOs)**

The NCTC under the MNS is to partner with CSOs in all facets of its programmes on violent extremism and CT, particularly of the following areas:

a. Addressing conditions conducive for the spread of extremism and terrorism including, human rights, conflict resolution, rule of law, social, political and economic issues. The CSOs are to engage in outreach activities and proactive steps to address the root causes of terrorism.

b. Targeting programmes of cooperation then focus on promotion of dialogue and tolerance.

c. Providing Policy advice and expertise on aspects of preventing terrorism and developing security consciousness and situation awareness through sustained public enlightenment campaigns.

d. Mobilizing and sensitizing the general public on how to respond to major emergency security situations.